SPACE & SOCIAL THEORY

Interpreting Modernity and Postmodernity

EDITED BY
GEORGES BENKO & ULF STROHMAYER
Identity, Space, and other Uncertainties

Wolfgang Natter and John Paul Jones III

Introduction

Any effort to measure the character of the “postmodern” is fraught with difficulty, not the least due to its overlapping and sometimes conflicting meanings. What is more, these meanings have been differentially imported into, and appropriated by, the social sciences and humanities. As a result, and especially during early phases of the debates surrounding postmodernism, one could often find surprising variance in the ways in which “it” was deployed within individual disciplines.¹ Over-and-above this multiaccentual reception—which intersected with a series of new substantive inquiries such as “flexible accumulation,” “modes of information,” and “orientalism”—a key cross-disciplinary outcome of nearly two decades of engagements with postmodernism has been a rigorous questioning of the certainties that earlier on worked to separate the aims, methods, and objects of various fields. The unsettling of foundational ontologies brought by a postmodern rethinking of power, representation, and disciplinary history has now come to resonate across the “great divide” of the social sciences and the humanities, giving scholars occasion to peer beyond ensconced disciplinary borders.

The resulting uncertainties—the epistemological provocations of which were presaged by much poststructuralist thinking—do more than problematize disciplinary boundaries,² they enable inquiry into substantive matters the articulation of which had hitherto been limited by disciplinary circumscription. In this essay, we deploy a poststructural epistemology in an effort to articulate two such substantive domains of current interest to those sympathetic to postmodernism: identity and space. A poststructuralist—or nonessentialist—stance toward identity recognizes both the theoretical impulses that announced the “death of the subject” during the late 1960s, as well as the failures of liberalism and Marxism to usher in a democratic society based on their versions of identity politics. Meanwhile, space has been problematized through postmodernism’s attention to context and contingency, as well as through efforts to understand the new social landscapes accompanying the arrival of late, disorganized, or flexible capitalism.
Those attracted to the challenges posed by poststructuralism have raised several questions that apply to identity theory, and these animate the analysis that follows: how does identity arise, how is it differentiated, and how is it maintained? It is a premise of this essay that any answer to these questions must necessarily engage space. Inasmuch as social relations constitute and embed both identities and space, theorizing the linkages between these moments is an important task for social theory. This essay, then, asks the following: can we envision a poststructuralist, or nonessentialist, theory of space that is commensurate with poststructuralist identity theory?

Our efforts to theorize these connections are prefaced with a critical analysis of the “category” – Der Begriff – meant both in-and-of itself and in its relation to the process of classification. This discussion is necessary inasmuch as essentialist theories of “identity” and “space” are themselves grounded in essentialist conceptions of the category. Moreover, our critique of essentialist categories bears directly on an ongoing political question: can the identities of social subjects be theorized in ways that are not complicitous with either holistic and hermetic identifications or with the total annihilation of the “social?”

This question is important for those who reject both indifference and foundationalism in thinking about politics. On the one hand, the unwillingness to conjoin difference – for fear that doing so will reintroduce hierarchy and metanarrative – makes politics unpracticable. On the other hand, foundationalism limits in advance the forms of identification through which politics might be practiced. Two forms of contemporary politics underscore the latter point. First, neo-conservatives have offered a version of identity politics that deploys a rhetoric of individuation while wrestling from individuals oversight over policies the outcome of which is worldwide submission to corporatist economics. Those on the “left,” meanwhile, often confront this individualist rhetoric with their own entrenched and no less essentialist categories of identification, ones that may now have become so instrumentalized as to present obstacles for rethinking democracy. And because identity politics – as everyday practice – finds its ideal types congealed in the social sciences as separate systems of thought, e.g., Marxism versus feminism, feminism versus black feminism, etc., these issues resound with implications for politics within theory itself.

The argument we present is organised as follows. We first explore the complications that arise for identity and identity politics via the “category.” We then discuss nonessentialist or poststructuralist identity theory, drawing both upon Laclau and Mouffe’s understanding of hegemony – as the process by which identification/identity congeals as apparently fixed, if not natural – and upon Derrida’s formulation of the relational process – the constitutive outside – by which all identities are inscribed by the “other” they ostensibly exclude. This in turn leads us to an understanding of space that, like identity, is never fixed, monolithic, and bound, but is open to interventions when theorized through nonessentialist theory. Our aim, in short, is to dislodge remnant essentialisms from spatial thought. This evacuation and rearticulation leads to an examination of the productive uncertainties commensurate with a nonessentialist politics of both space and identity.
The Essentializing Category

Given that any discussion of identity, whether couched in terms of gender, sexuality, race, or class, necessarily involves the question of boundaries – as in where and how identity becomes circumscribed – it seems useful to begin a consideration of the identities thus identified by asking what is at stake in the process of categorization itself. First, inchoate and singular events/objects are formed for thought through categories. The resulting representations of events/objects are the necessary precondition for all communication. Thus, even the severe critique of the category found in the Dialectic of Enlightenment – written in reaction to a time/place where its always possible misuse had become palpable as a place of terror – already acknowledges the futility of rejecting general concepts, categories, and classification. As Horkheimer and Adorno emphasized, however, critique becomes necessary when socially dominant groups employ categories self-identically, as if referring to the “things themselves,” instead of being understood as meaning-full representations of them: “Classification is a condition for cognition, and not cognition itself;” moreover, all categories, as representations, are open to scrutiny and reformulation, for: “cognition in turn dispels classification.”

In the dialectic between cognition and instrumentality that together comprise Reason, the category is a component of instrumental and not “pure” reason, and thus, though necessary, the category is always revisable. Rather than the mere filling-in of linguistic containers that facilitate communication, the category's role in instrumental reason suggests that it is a purposeful construction that is never neutral in intent nor inconsequential in effect. As Foucault argued, where one encounters the category, one of necessity also finds ordering, hierarchy, and – under the aegis of instrumental reason – tools for social domination. In short, in the category there lurks a particular form of social power: the ability to seize alterity and assign it a social significance.

With respect to identity theory, the power of the category is manifest in the construction of fixed social identifications out of the multiplicity of unnamed alterity. In this process, the category subsumes individual particularity via equivalence. For Horkheimer and Adorno, modern capitalist society's reliance upon equivalence – the basis of exchange value – further enhanced the power of the category to process social objects based on abstractions of their “qualities.”

Bourgeois society is ruled by equivalence. It makes the dissimilar comparable by reducing it to abstract quantities. To the Enlightenment, that which does not reduce to numbers, and ultimately to the one, becomes illusion; modern positivism writes it off as literature.

Given capitalism's tendency to disaggregate “humanity” from human labor and to deploy what is left as an “abstract” value exchangeable in commodity form, it should not be surprising that Horkheimer and Adorno have a particularly pessimistic account of the identity assigned Enlightenment subjects:
"[people] were given their individuality as unique in each case, different to all others, so that it might all the more surely be made the same as any other."\textsuperscript{6} As a generalizing moment, the category's framing of Identity, abstracted from the multiple qualities which inhere in the identities contained by this frame, is precisely what lends the category a force far and above what the elements themselves might marshal. As these authors depict the reversal from identities to identity: "The identity of the category forbids that of the individual cases ... Now any person signifies only those attributes by which he can replace everybody else: he is interchangeable, a copy."\textsuperscript{7}

One possibility for resisting this homogenizing effect – whereby identities are reduced to nothing more than the category that collects them – is to question the accuracy and adequacy of the category to describe the social "objects" brought under its umbrella. In the face of the category's power to stereotype the identities contained within it, one response has been to call for a respecification of the boundaries of the category such that it more precisely aligns with the diversity of identities it contains. Certainly there are cases when this response can form an effective resistance to the domination of the category. For example, the scope of Marxist analysis certainly widened in the wake of feminist critiques of the universality ascribed to its subject; in turn, recognition of the diversity of women's experiences has widened the project of feminism beyond a white, middle-class formulation of its universality.\textsuperscript{8} However, the mere assertion of diversity within the category can be problematic, when, for example, instead of rethinking the process of categorization, it merely reinscribes a new system of boundaries around increasingly differentiated subjects. Though this may achieve a more precise encapsulation of Identity, it is ultimately destined to proliferate into a fragmentation of ever more complex social categories. And because these narrower categorical specifications are typically constructed as further differentiated versions of already existing categories, it leaves intact the system of boundaries used to collect alterity in the first place.

One can chart the political implications of differentiating categorical diversity by recalling the fragmentation of left-liberal politics in the United States over the past two decades. The late 1960s witnessed the near-simultaneous coalescence of a diverse set of already politicized social movements – denigrated in the succeeding decades as "interest groups" – organized around racial equality, the elimination of poverty, and women's rights. The possibilities for unifying this multiplicity during the late 1960s were very much enhanced by widespread anger over United States' militarism during the Vietnam War. Moreover, for commentators like Herbert Marcuse, the reaction against militarism also pointed to the possibility of global linkages between the left coalition within the "developed" countries and movements within the "underdeveloped" countries trying to free themselves from colonial oppression.\textsuperscript{9} Yet just as quickly as the War ended, the galvanizing force of anti-militarism was lost. The various focuses of the left-liberal coalition in the United States became narrower and – as a result – less effective.

For us, these developments partly explain Reagan's widely recognized ability
to fill the growing interstitial political arena created by the receding boundaries of categorically-based politics with a discourse which drew upon a mythologizing sense of national identity and purpose and, simultaneously, a politics of divisiveness: black versus white, men versus women, poor versus rich. The Reagan coalition that captured representational democracy away from left-liberal groups would in the 1980s claim to speak from a position “beyond” the rancor of identity politics, enabling it to denigrate “interest group” positions as being outside the national consensus.

If anything, the experience of United States politics during the past 20 years underscores the fragility of deploying essentialist categories as the basis for political action. Both hegemony and, in a mirror image, counterhegemony, have spoken the language of fixed identity/space. Phrased in terms of the category, it seems to us that the task at hand is to theorize outside an essentialism the polar moments of which are, at one end, a blindness toward diversity, and at the other end, the total disintegration of the category. Given the force of postmodernism’s critique of metanarratives, recognition of the value of local knowledges, and various destabilizations of the feminist standpoint, we are unlikely to soon witness the arrival of an overarching category capable of uniting left politics. And as Chantal Mouffe comments in reference to the latter of the polar oppositions, the valorization of all differences – as the postmodern embrace of “heterogeneity, dissemination, and incommensurability” – presents its own dangers to politics, for where “all interests, all opinions, all differences are seen as legitimate,” complete indifferentiation and indifference result.\(^{10}\)

We believe that what may be more helpful just now is a theorization of categories and subjects that refuses either to subsume difference within the homogenizing moment of the category, or to dispense with the category altogether. And importantly, it is not only the end points, but indeed each point in the continuum given parameters by these polar moments that needs to be questioned, for compartmentalizing categories along ever more distinct lines of difference still relies upon the organizing principle of the category that never questions the status of the subject. As Mouffe puts it:

we would have made no advance at all if we were simply going to replace the notion of a unified and homogeneous subject by a multiplicity and fragmentation in which each of the fragments retains a closed and fully constituted identity. As we have argued ..., such an essentialism of the “elements” remains within the problematic that it tries to displace, because a clear-cut identity pre-supposes a determinate system of relations with all the fragments or “elements” – and what is this but the reintroduction of the category of totality whose elimination was the meaning of the whole operation?\(^{11}\)

Mouffe’s non-embrace of “postmodernism” is underwritten by a poststructuralism that speaks in the name of difference. It invokes an identity theory based on the category of citizenship, an imaginary that reworks categories of class, gender, race, and sexuality for the purpose of a radical and plural democracy.\(^{12}\)

It is to poststructuralist identity theory that we now turn.
Nonessential Identity

Poststructuralist theory operates against both essentialist identity categories and the methodological processes that produce them. In contrast to the view that subjects lie at the center of the categories that encircle and empower them, poststructuralist identity theory starts with an understanding that identity is the product of categorization rather than its raw material. Thus, any essential identity, whether “grounded” in the language of origins or projected toward a telos that substantiates its promise, is an impossible ideal. For some social theorists, to so unhinge identity signals the unravelling of any form of politics. Yet as developed for example by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, recognizing identity as an imaginary construct immediately directs attention to hegemony, as in how hegemonic social power aims to fix identifications around “nodal points” where “identity” can be constructed and policed.¹³

Like hegemony, the constitutive outside directs our attention to the identifications through which composite identity is formed. In addition, it describes a process by which boundaries and categories are constructed and social objects within them are framed. The constitutive outside is a relational process by which the outside – or “other” – of any category is actively at work on both sides of the constructed boundary, and is thus always leaving its trace within the category. Thus, what may appear to be a self-enclosed category maintained by boundaries is found in fact to unavoidably contain the marks of inscription left by the outside from which it seemingly has been separated. As Derrida has shown through the work of deconstruction – beginning with his destabilization of writing and speech as separable practices¹⁴ – the outside of any category is already found to be resident within, permeating the category from the inside through its traceable presence-in-absence within the category.

What explains the character of this presence is the fact that the power to make and maintain difference is never undirectional: it always works from both within and outside the category. Though boundaries, through a process of hegemony, may appear as rigid and hermetic, the differences so sorted are never neatly contained; they are only maintained, and this through the force of the category itself. Moreover, while the outside marks the alterity of the inside, fashions its borders, assigns its social significance, and supervises its relations with other boundaries, the constructed inside, which is both agent and victim of this territorializing process, extends beyond itself to become another’s outside within.

What implications ensue from the recognition of the processes of hegemony and the constitutive outside? At one level, theory has long acknowledged that race, gender, nationality, ethnicity, and sexuality are socially constructed categories.¹⁵ Poststructuralist theory goes further, however, by asserting that as products of hegemony, the categories we take as materially significant not only lack a “natural” basis for grounding identity, but are the very grounds by which identity is produced. It is not just that categories are “social” – hardly a meaningful distinction, unless God is being invoked – but rather that those aspects of alterity that are seized upon and amplified into a system of social
differentiation are always contingently productive of subjects in the interest of hegemonic power. "Race," for example, is so widely naturalized as a significant category of identity that we have to be confronted by the hypothetical possibility that eye color could have been the basis for an equally oppressive system of difference for us to fully acknowledge the contingent nature of, say, skin color as a basis for a socially significant category. As Toni Morrison describes the contingency of this boundary-making process:

These slaves, unlike many others in the world's history, were visible to a fault. And they had inherited, among other things, a long history on the meaning of color; it was that this color "meant" something ... One supposes that if Africans all had three eyes or one ear, the significance of that difference from the smaller but conquering European invaders would have also been found to have meaning.¹⁶

To focus on the contingent social construction of the category, as opposed to, say, its implications in everyday social practice, might for some seem to imply an inattentiveness to the material effects – conquerors/slaves – of that construction. Precisely the opposite is true: it is only through the linkage of both – the construction of the category (i.e., race as representation) and the material effects that conform to and reproduce the category – that we can deconstruct with full force the deep structures that construct difference as meaningful and deploy it in hegemonic projects. Thus to question the social effects of racism without simultaneously asking how the differences collapsed in the category are defined and maintained, will inevitably reinforce the social hierarchy inscribed in and by the category, thus sustaining that hierarchy as inevitable. It is manifestly not a mystification of the material effects of social difference to assert its contingently constructed nature; rather, recognition of hegemony – the precondition for alternative strategies – requires that we ask questions as to how differences arise, are amplified and maintained through power, and toward what effect.

Answers to these questions benefit from the addition of an historical dimension, for over time hegemony's rendition of identity as fixed, natural, and inevitable offers grounds for recognition of them as nodal points – temporary locations for social identification. Over time, that hegemony best sustains itself that secures tradition as a seal of its destiny – the desirable culmination of the past in the present, laden with future promise. Whether deployed as a pre-articulation so weighted in the present that its fulfillment is "destined" to arrive, or presented ex post facto as a selective ordering of past events which "necessarily" demonstrate the present as a casual link in a past/future teleology – tradition can be used, in Benjamin's words, to buttress the present rulers who are "the heirs of those who conquered before them."¹⁷

The above argument suggests, first, that counterhegemonic practices work to expose the contingent construction of hegemonically constituted nodal points. This involves an interrogation of the "cultural treasures" put on display by the guardians of tradition wherever and whenever dense cultural capital is at stake. In so doing, theorists will be identifying potential sites of disarticula-
tion so that tradition can be unframed— in Benjamin’s sense— and actualized as it always really is: “thoroughly alive and extremely changeable.”

Following the disclosure of the cultural moments constituting hegemonically defined identities, the task for an alternative politics is to work towards new cultural practices that subvert and rework dominant nodal points. For Michel Pecheux, one strategy beyond a counterhegemonic reversal of the hierarchies embedded in any categorization is that of disidentification, a relation to the hegemonic that is neither identification—as the fulfillment of hegemony—or anti-identification—as its opposite. The latter strategy, as Rosemary Hennessy notes, is that of the “bad subject” the rebellion of which against hegemonic subject identifications keeps in place the system imposed by hegemonic ideology. Disidentification, by contrast, is a critique that disrupts and rearranges “the pre-constructed categories on which the formation of subjects depend.” This subject does not claim to speak from any group identity; rather she exposes by critique the entire system that constitutes identity.

For us, such tactics of resistance are made all the more possible when practiced in recognition of the constitutive outside, because this process bespeaks a recognition that no dominant cultural strategy proves in fact to be so seamless that the trace of exclusion is not in evidence. Facilitating the deconstruction of any identity’s claim to an ordinary or self-referential standpoint, the constitutive outside suggests counterhegemonic practices that expose the presence of the outside/other within the boundaries of dominant cultural groups. As Toni Morrison describes this process as it operates within American literature, the canon is thoroughly marked with the trace of Africanism necessary to construct the American cultural tradition:

Explicit or implicit, the Africanist presence informs in compelling and inescapable ways the texture of American literature. It is a dark and abiding presence, there for the literary imagination as both a visible and invisible mediating force. Even, and especially, when American texts are not “about” Africanist presences or characters or narrative or idiom, the shadow hovers in implication, in sign, in line of demarcation. It is no accident and no mistake that immigrant populations (and much immigrant literature) understood their “Africananness” as an opposition to the resident black population.

Thus for Morrison, this ineluctable “dark and abiding” trace in American literature is constitutive of identity itself: “the self-conscious but highly problematic construction of the American as the new white man.” But what specific forms of politics accompany the recognition of the constitutive outside? We would offer that this process, far from so decentering the subject that politics is unthinkable, has several advantages for strategies aimed to resist hegemony. First, and as Said has made clear in the case of the European construction of the “Orient,” the relational process so described raised questions as to who has the power to construct the “other,” and how such constructions, far from being merely a projection onto the “other,” provide the very grounds for constituting the “self.” Second, the mutual dependencies
derived from this constitutive process can be the basis for articulating alternative nodal point configurations that rework (e.g., through disidentification) rather than reinforce the surplus of social resistances now demarcated according to gender, sexuality, class, ethnicity, race, ableness, environment, Third World, etc. As Mouffe stresses the difference: “it is not a matter of establishing a mere alliance between given interests but of actually modifying the very identity of these forces.”24 And finally, the constitutive outside also points to the possibility of interweaving and thereby strengthening new nodal points. When, as Mouffe offers, these interconnected social movements are linked by a “chain of equivalence,”25 rearticulated counterhegemonic subject positions offer a viable alternative to a politics that presents as its choices either the subsumption of difference or its ever increasing fragmentation.

Nonessential Space

We are now posed to consider the question of a spatial theory commensurate with our understanding of the subject as a temporary determination—a provisional nodal point subverted, asserted, and reconstituted through contingent social relations. The construction of such a theory cannot rely solely on a nonessentialist conception of the subject, but requires a similar conception of space. Because subjects achieve and resist their systems of identification in and through social space, it follows that without a nonessentialist conception of space— as an also open, heterogeneous, and indeterminate field—extant spatialities, both in theory and practice, would only reinstate or at the least reinforce an essentializing moment in identity theory. The task is thus to produce a nonessentialist theory of social space.

Partial steps in this direction have already been suggested by theorists attempting to combine the socio-spatial dialectic with identity theory.26 What makes the socio-spatial dialectic a propitious avenue for spatializing identity theory is that it too makes social relations a central theoretical moment. As Lefebvre repeatedly emphasized, space is produced by social relations that it also reproduces, mediates, and transforms.27 For him, the materialization of this dialectical interchange is social space itself: the sublation of social relations and space on an uncertain path in a way that is open toward the reformulation of each.

However, it should be emphasized that the socio-spatial dialectic does not in-and-of-itself foreclose an essentialist understanding of social relations, and hence, of identity. There are manifold ways to theorize social relations, and some of these—for example, certain deployments of the concept of Class—offer no guarantees that one does not inscribe an essentialist spatiality, and with it, a fixed and homogeneous politics of space. Therefore, in contrast to a category of space as self-present social essence, it is more useful to start with a conception of space that, like the subject, is a lack to be filled, contested, and reconfigured through contingent and partially determined social relations, practices, and meanings.
The manifest danger in an essentialist conception of social space is given by the *strategic* fact that hegemonic cultural practices will always attempt to fix the meaning of space, arranging any number of particularities, disjunctures, and juxtapositions into a seamless unity: the one place, the one identity, as in, for example, the "Nation." Yet hegemony, as the process that naturalizes both space and social relations, is like any form of power: never fixed or inevitable but always open to exposure, confrontation, reversal, and refusal through counterhegemonic or disidentifying practices. Attempts at normalization can never therefore be fully complete, for the same indeterminate and always partially sutured social relations implicated in the construction of identity are understood through the socio-spatial dialectic — also implicated in the production of space. Space, no less than identity, will always therefore offer the potential for *tactical* refusal and resistance.

Argument against an essentialist understanding of spatiality therefore additionally confronts the structural impulse that undergirds the theorization of space as a stabilized and stabilizing product. As a process that organizes alterity, such stabilizations result in the *appearance* of totalization in the form of a structured coherence of space — discrete units at various scales: neighborhoods, cities, regions, and nations. However, spatial structures elide totalization — except, perhaps, in appearance — for no structure can fully erase difference. Instead, any structure, in this case spatial, simultaneously incarnates alterity and — through configuration and hierarchy — imposes order over it. Though structured space can be presented as a totality — in ways that are naturalized via representations of space — such orderings can never thoroughly subsume difference.

This line of argument can be extended to address the production and maintenance of spatial boundaries more generally. All such circumscriptions are based on an ordering of alterity, yet the crucial issue is not simply that the boundaries that result from such an ordering are socially constituted or, for that matter, porous, but rather that this process proceeds by assigning an *origin* around which alterity is structured. The boundaries of any "region" can only be drawn by first constructing an "origin" from alterity, and upon interrogation, such an "origin" always proves to have been set in place in the absence of any a priori foundation. Already ontologically then, any structure implies the potential for a reversal or displacement, that is, the possibility that the origin could in another context be an "other." As a social process, origins are imminently contestable through a displacement in which the structuring locus is lost, or through dissemination, by which the "origin" gives rise to effects over which it has no control.

The structural critique also has implications for the status of such concepts as "center" and "periphery" that have been deployed as organizing principles in structured space. The (social) process of centering entails a structuring moment necessary to perform the ordering, but at the same time any such structuring implies the assignation of a periphery. Assignment to the periphery "provides a home" — one of terror — for "the other," the mere existence of which was both a provocation to, and the raw material for, the center. The power
emanating from the center that, on the one hand, peripheralizes alterity, on the other hand incorporates traces of the periphery from which it is constitutively constructed. As in a poststructural theorization of “self” and “other,” to speak of a “center” and a “periphery” is already to acknowledge the latter’s constitutive power. Accordingly, there is not only – as bell hooks has amplified – a power in the margin, but also, through the constitutive outside, a peripheral power poised to deconstruct any center of which it is a part.

Still another route to unhinging the self-grounding epistemology substantiating space and thereby confirming it as a pre-given articulation, is to conceptualize it as both materiality and – through the system of signification contingently adhered to it – as representation. In combining both lines of argument, space is not simply a socially produced materiality but a socially produced – and forceful – object/sign system. This, which we refer to as a “system of representation”, does not deny materiality, but rather argues that any materiality is attached to the representation(s) through which that materiality both embeds and conveys social meaning.

To conceive of all spaces as being stamped by signification suggests that we resist the temptation to conceive of “mere” ideology as an intrusion upon our ability to grasp the “essence of space” in its full and unmediated presence. This view – a hangover from the historic tendency to separate materiality from representation – presupposes the ability to call forth, through ideology critique, a space (die Sache selbst) purged of hegemony. Such an approach merely reproduces the objectivist and essentialist view of space it seeks to replace, for, as Rosalyn Deutsche points out, it falsely promises the possibility of severing materiality – as full presence – and representation – as ideological overlay.

An appropriate theory of space as representation will, therefore, not only question the apparent unity of the object and sign, but also the possibility of their separation. In this view, the representational can neither be eliminated nor honed to a “correct” specification. Nor can the spatial be rendered apolitical. We are left, then, with space as an always already, but never pre-determined, representation. Though materialized in space – for example, in the ideologies embedded in our streets, buildings, monuments, and neighborhoods – the anchors of representation are always open to disruption. Freed from the moorings of a rigidified and fixed spatiality, the social meanings of space can be contested as they actually are: thoroughly open, and never self-identical or outside social processing. Social space, despite its apparent substantive materiality, is thus also characterized by an emptiness, one which social powers work to substantiate with meaning content, truth value, objectivity.

All of this recognizes that space, like identity, is equally subject to the naturalizing processes of hegemony. Just as fixed identities rely upon categories condensed at nodal points, so too does the meaning content, truth value, and objectivity assignable to any spatial object/sign system rely upon its naturalization. Hegemonic spatiality, the categorically ordered possibilities for, and the construction of, meanings about any space, is a representational process that works to tie “readers” – or “operators” – however tentatively, to “texts” – and
"space." The common distinctions between public and private space, for example, demonstrate the ability of hegemonic powers to naturalize spatial categories in the vested interests of those benefiting from capitalist property relations. One might ask, however, how much more effective might socio-spatial praxis be if the category "private" were denaturalized, that is, repositioned as a mere temporary categorization the cultural markers of which — the "No Trespassing" sign, the fence — were open to contestation and transgression?

Finally, in thinking space through the constitutive outside, it is apparent that any category representationally adhered to space already bears the marks of the other it aims to exclude. As categories, representations are not sewn seamlessly into the fabric of space; rather, the very process of exclusion that permits the category also permits oppositional moments to insert themselves into the object/sign system. Thus any space, as representation, is an already possible site for deconstruction. Or what is the same, the bar

-/-

in any object/sign system is never fully continuous.37

Practicing Uncertainty

In this section, we consider how to construct a politics capable of confronting the calcifications of both space and identity that emerge from their essentialist formulation. Let us begin with an equation, deeply etched in the fabric of spatial and cultural thought, which has normalized a set of operating assumptions regarding the relations between space and identity:

\[ \text{certain spaces} = \text{certain identities} \]

The equation certifies a homologous alignment between space and identity. Historically, it also characterizes entire traditions of modernist (and essentialist) geographies, ranging from the mapping of peoples by cultural and regional geographers to the assumptions about identity built into the theoretical models of scientific and Marxist geographers. It equally has served to provide governing norms for the study of culture in relationship to "the peoples" that produce it (e.g. national literatures). Thought un-essentially, however, the equation immediately prompts questions for social theorists concerning the hegemonic production of identifications in and through space that determine how exactly "certain" spaces and identities come to be equated. Thought un-essentially, the equation also becomes a matter of considerable interest to social actors who must live with its determinate effects.

The generally veiled or "socialized" force of these alignments provokes shock when their dynamic is put on display by the media at moments of violent excess, such as occurred in New York's suburb of Howard Beach. It is important to emphasize, however, that from the perspective of its victims, the violence which structures space/identity is part of everyday life at all scales — from the license of exclusion issued through private property relations and the reinforcement
of patriarchy through housing design to the patriotic identities forged in nation states. As we have seen, hegemony not only perpetually processes identifications to which "identity" may then become attached, it does so spatially, by disciplining the meanings and practices associated with any social space. This structuring, historically and geographically, has served the aim of stamping both identity and space with a resolute correspondence: every identity has its place. 38

When thought through the selection criteria hegemony provides to decide what is "certain" about space and identity, the above equation points not only to the social facts of space/identity alignments, but also to the production of them. The normalizations rendered by the equation suggest that we reflect more carefully on the character of the "certain" in our hypothesis. At this juncture, our argument can profit from an investigation of the dictionary definition of the modifier, "certain." Perhaps when read in a manner that considers the differential meanings attached by the dictionary to "certain," the equation may turn out after all to reflect the relationships between space and identity this essay has sought to explore.

In Webster's Third New International Dictionary, the reader learns that certain meanings of "certain" are so differently. Of the six definitions listed, all but the second, to which we return below, form a cluster of meanings that reinforce the stabilizing moments indicated in a normative reading of the equation:

1 fixed, settled, stated, exact, precise;
2 sure, dependable;
3 inevitable, destined;
4 complete assurance and conviction;
5 steadfast.

Leaving aside the slightly different orbits that each of these inscribes (i.e., dependable versus inevitable, steadfast versus fixed), these definitions, when applied to the equation, imply a determined, uncompromised, and teleologically grounded relation between space and identity, one whose certainty is not to be doubted.

Definition (2), by contrast, undermines these certainties through a qualification of their specification and precision, and indeed, of the possibility and desirability of foreclosure in categorization itself. In this definition, certain means:

particular, of a character difficult or unwise to specify – used to distinguish a person or thing not otherwise distinguished or not distinguishable in more precise terms.

This definition registers a residue of imprecision, introducing into "certain" an uncertainty regarding the inevitability and desirability of further specifying the contents of named objects (e.g., space and identity). No longer defined by the parameters that determine and fix objects, "certain" unspecificities regard-
ing the moments linked by the equation suggest themselves. First, the boundaries of both the containers “space” and “identity” are, under definition (2), no longer as specified or specifiable as previously held. The uncertainties, specificities, and particularities necessitated by this definition tend to render the equation unstable. Second, the imprecisions invoked by this definition also concern those characteristics of persons or things which it is difficult or unwise to distinguish, raising a question as to what processes were at work in fixing the initial connotation of the term. In other words, what is it about the object and the character of the category that makes further queries concerning its suitability unwise or difficult? Third, and finally, the principle of the constitutive outside is in force. Within its connotative meanings, the boundaries of the generally certain are pierced by the particular within. The exclusion of alterity, as the less than specified and determined, proves never to be total and complete, even in the dictionary.

This analysis, while lexicographically suggesting that no identity can claim “certainty” with regard to space (and vice versa), now points to the question of a social praxis commensurate with both nonessentialist identity and space. That such an opening is present in praxis is consistent with our assertion that hegemony is never a closed process, either with regards to space or identity. But what might a praxis that works against both essentialist identity and space look like?

A nonessentialist praxis of identity and space will first of all reject the notion that politics must conform to a telos the destiny of which is the attainment of absolute consensus. This view, common in some “progressive” communitarian formulations, holds the promise that counterhegemony portends a full and total reversal of hegemony. This view, however, merely reinscribes a system of identity and space the grounds of which remain essential and the borders of which self-enclosed. To conceive of identities and spaces as open and plural sites of multiple identifications suggests instead that praxis be conceived as an ongoing project, one activated precisely in recognition of a lack of political guarantees. As Mouffe puts it:

... while politics aims at constructing a political community and creating a unity, a fully inclusive political community and a final unity can never be realized since there will permanently be a “constitutive outside,” an exterior to the community that makes its existence possible. Antagonistic forces will never disappear and politics is characterized by conflict and division.39

For Mouffe, what explains this ever-present antagonism is the impossibility of stabilizing and giving closure to identity. For us, her argument also implies that space be recognized as an open-ended site of social contestation and antagonism. When thought through the constitutive outside, which recognizes that spatial categories are not fixed but made by the ongoing exclusion of an other that is deferred elsewhere, spatial politics is cut loose from teleological certainties and the apparent stability they guarantee for the present. As an unfixed
category, space proves always open to a politics of reconfiguring difference differently.

Second, nonessentialist praxis would attempt to rework both identity and space by reconfiguring the field of socio-spatial relations that maintain dominant meanings and practices in social space. The possibility of transgressing such extant meanings/practices was already articulated by Walter Benjamin in the 1930s drawing upon the new medium of film as an example ready at hand. For him, the impression of a regulated coherence of space is a contingent matter that is open to transformative possibilities:

Our taverns and our metropolitan streets, our offices and furnished rooms, our railroad stations and our factories appear to have us locked up hopelessly. Then came the film and burst this prison-world asunder by the dynamite of the tenth of a second, so that now, in the midst of its far-flung ruins and debris, we calmly and adventurously go travelling.\footnote{40}

Benjamin invokes the moving image’s power to cognize otherwise, thereby contenvening the extant ontology seemingly substantiated in the materiality of inherited social space. His destabilizations of a spatial epistemology that only seems to have us “locked up” is consistent with our view of spaces as indeterminate, localized, and temporary nodal points that are “essentially” un-fixed and productive of contestory possibilities based on juxtaposition, withdrawal, and dislocation.

A socio-spatial praxis consistent with this understanding will seek to liberate thought and action from the regulated coherence imposed by the ordered and monumentalized spaces of everyday experience. Resisting the power that organizes both social and spatial fields involves disidentifying space from this regulated coherence, and especially from that one opposition that forms the basis for further segmentations, namely, the distinction between “public” and “private” space. A spatial praxis of disidentification would work to disclose and circumvent the processes the verdict of which presumes to seal the fate of social space as private, and, as a corollary, as male, heterosexual, white, militarist, First World, etc.

Various tactics are already being deployed to circumvent dominant assumptions and practices of regulated spaces. These include any defacement, transgression, or occupation of space that: exposes as merely contingent systems of spatial representations; activates the presumably excluded power of the constitutive outside; or breaks through the “certain” alignments of space and identity. Examples of social movements that have practiced such tactics include: the Greenham Common’s women’s peace group camped at the border of a military installation in the United Kingdom; the interruption of religious services at New York’s St Patrick’s Cathedral by gay rights activists; and the cross-class, anti-gentrification struggle culminating in the Tompkins Square uprising in New York City in 1988.\footnote{41} In each of the above cases, spatial praxis consisted of defacement, transgression, or occupation of dominant space's
meanings and practices. These actions served to expose space for what it is, a contingent, hegemonically maintained system of representation.

The examples listed above demonstrate that spatial praxis is necessarily site specific. Our choice of them should not, however, imply that social movements should be confined to the “merely” local, or to any boundary imposed by structured space. For in destabilizing the equation between space and identity, our aim is not simply to disidentify “certain” identities from “certain” spaces, but to spatially disidentify praxis itself. This becomes desirable inasmuch as one of the spatial effects of hegemony is the containment of spatial praxis, which locates and localizes resistance, thereby limiting the range of nodal points that can be articulated. The result of these localizations is a centered politics of both space and identity that leaves unrealized potential connections across space to other, similarly bounded, identities. A social movement that works against hegemony in all its forms must not only disidentify from the categories of identity processed by hegemony, it must also disidentify from the spaces in which it has been situated and maintained.

What we have called for “in theory” can already be found in the practices of those social movements and organizations that resist the categorical imperatives of hegemony. An additional example – perhaps a surprising one for those who look to metropolitan areas to provide the settings for such activities – is that of Appalshop, a multimedia, community-based cultural center whose activists have engaged in various forms of activities relevant to our discussion.42

Appalshop is located in Whitesburg, Kentucky, a town inhabited by 3,000 people in the Pine Mountain area of Appalachia. The coal industry has deeply etched itself underneath and on the (physical and social) surface of the area’s landscape. A century of economic, social, and environmental exploitation in the region has resulted in rates of unemployment, poverty, and illiteracy that climb to over one-half of the population in many counties. Appalshop, which can trace its beginnings to a 1969 federal grant enabling the formation of media studies program for area youth, has produced films, music, plays, and worked with other media in order to document Appalachia’s history of social struggle and to otherwise preserve and transmit mountain cultural traditions. This counterhegemonic effort was propelled by a recognition that the identity assigned the region and its inhabitants was forged by the hegemonic production of cultural stereotypes perpetuated to legitimate the theft of land and resources by the coal industry and its political agencies.43 The image of ignorant, drunken, and duelling “hillbillies” drew upon a familiar nature-culture dichotomy, one which, in colonialism’s history, has been activated in various settings to ideologically legitimate the “development” of colonized regions by outsiders, because these region’s inhabitants, as “savages,” were themselves disqualified. Appalshop productions were directed towards reanimating the region’s traditions while refusing such images hegemonically assigned to it over the course of its exploitation. Thought much of Appalshop’s productions over the course of the 25 years of its existence have worked to preserve Appalachian music, oral traditions, and other cultural practices – and in this sense have discovered
alternative, positive views of "mountain life"—its productions also evidence an ever-increasing body of work that problematizes the very character of what it means to be in or from "Appalachia." This tacit deconstruction of the categories of identity used to mark people and place has ensued in recognition of the diversity of social groups residing within Appalachia. In recent years, Appalshop productions have increasingly reflected the recognition that Appalachia, as a social space, has always been in transit. Appalshop films have imaged the limits on self-enclosure that waves of migration and diaspora have set, while historical excavation has uncovered the African and Native American influences on the area's cultural artifacts (even the quintessential instrument of Bluegrass music—the banjo—has its own history in Africa). Appalshop, while continuing to uncover neglected or nearly forgotten cultural traditions the recovery of which serve to deepen an appreciation of the multiple and multi-cultural identities out of which the region's culture has been shaped, has developed a series of programs which move beyond counterhegemonic resistance to categorically disidentify the region and its inhabitants from a self-enclosed identity.

Appalshop's spatial disidentifications have been furthered recently by its involvement with a series of regional, national and international cross-cultural exchanges. As part of the American Festival Project, for example, Appalshop's Roadside Theater has collaborated with other community-based theaters in the United States (as well as in Guatemala and Russia) which likewise are problematizing notions of identity. Along with the African-American "Junebug Productions" located in New Orleans, with "Taetro Pregones," a Puerto-Rican theater group from the South Bronx of New York, with the feminist African-American dance troupe "Urban Bush Women," also from New York, and with the Pueblo Zuni dancers of New Mexico, members of the Whitesburg community have found that they share with other communities economic and cultural suffering as the outcome of hegemonic disempowerment. These exchanges have not only pointed to how hegemony works by stratifying identifications in diverse locales, they have also demonstrated that global capitalism is each locale's constitutive outside, and, what is the same, that the alterity of areas like Appalachia constitute global capitalism itself.

Thus, "from within," Appalshop has aimed to denaturalize the hegemonic constructs of place-identity that have reinforced the disempowerment of most of the region's citizens. By reworking those extant traces that refuse the hegemonic identifications assigned the region, the area's tradition, has become, as Benjamin would have it, "thoroughly alive and extremely changeable." Towards the world "outside the mountains," meanwhile, Appalshop has pursued a national and international dialogue based on the principle that such dialogue best confronts the intersection of economy and culture at the grass roots level, from one community to another. What might have seemed an unlikely site for plural and multiple identity-constitution has via Appalshop become a promising exemplar of the productive uncertainty of identity/space equivalence.
Conclusion

Our discussion has deployed understandings of both hegemony and the constitutive outside in order to undermine the apparent naturalness, stability, and boundedness of identity. Stressing the inseparability of identity and space through the socio-spatial dialectic, we also have argued a similar understanding for space—both through the structuring processes that organize it and through its status as a disclosable object/sign system. The linkages we have made suggest that the deployment of essentialist categories of either identity or space will only reinforce the other's essentialization.

A nonessentialist stance toward social space—which for us includes space and identity in an ever open dialectic—thus points to a praxis that recognizes that no identity/space is so colonized by hegemony as to remove all traces of its organizing power. The form of resistance most antithetical to hegemony is one that refuses the emplacement of categorically designated identifications, while offering a potentially effective strategy for reconfiguring nodal points of both identity and space. In this regard, disidentification—even while generally thought of as being outside an economy of production—becomes a tactic that enables a refusal of concepts—e.g., the "private" and the "public"—that ground such economies.

The dual disidentification we have called for does not therefore depend upon or involve a "liberation" emanating from either the destruction of extant or the production of new (material) spaces, but an epistemological reconfiguration of "certain spaces" and "certain identities" in terms of their meanings and associated practices. Made more effective by recognition of the dialectical relationships between identity and space, the praxis commensurate with the epistemological transformation this affords will continue to denaturalize, expose, and contest the essentialization of both social and spatial categories. The epistemological recognition that "the postmodern" has definitively etched out in theory and to a considerable extent in academic discourse more broadly is one that can be linked to already extant social movements that have found similar, albeit differently phrased, reasons to reject a politics based either on foundationalism or on indifference. In refusing spatial orderings that reproduce structurally derived social categories, this praxis (and theory) will work to transform the structures and strictures of everyday space, while also reconfiguring the range of social identifications made possible by a politics of space.

Acknowledgments

The authors thank Ulf Strohmayer for his editorial comments on an earlier draft of this chapter, Caron Atlas of Appalshop for helpful discussions, and Sophie, Max, and Joseph for giving us reasons to think about the uncertainties that await.
Notes

1 Any effort to make sense of the character of the ‘postmodern’ will find it useful to
differentiate the elements of its reception within the social sciences and the
humanities. See Postmodern Contentions: Epochs, Politics, Space, John Paul Jones III,

2 Difficult as it is to date the arrival of any intellectual tradition, it nevertheless seems
clear the poststructuralism’s emergence as a distinct theoretical shift owes much
to the international symposium on ‘The Languages and Sciences of Man’, held at
Johns Hopkins University in the autumn of 1966. The collected proceedings can
be found in Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donato, (eds), The Structuralist Contro-

3 Max Horkheimer, and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, translated by

4 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (New York, Pantheon, 1970).

5 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 7.

6 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 13.

7 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 145.

8 For feminist critiques of marxism, see Nancy C. M. Hartsock, Money, Sex and Power
(Boston, Northeastern University Press, 1984); and Lydia Sargent, (ed.), Women
and Revolution: The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism (London, Pluto
Press, 1981). For critiques of white feminism, see: Patricia Hill Collins, Black
Feminist Thought (London, Routledge, 1991); bell hooks, Ain’t I a Woman: Black
Women and Feminism (Boston, South End Press, 1981), Feminist Theory from Margin
to Center (Boston, South End Press, 1983), and Talking Back: Thinking Feminist,
Thinking Black (Boston, South End Press, 1989).

9 Herbert Marcuse, ‘Political Preface, 1966’, in Eros and Civilization (Boston, Beacon

10 Chantal Mouffe, ‘Democratic Politics Today’, in Dimensions of Radical Democracy:
Pluralism, Citizenship, and Community, Chantal Mouffe, (ed.), (London, Verso,
1992), pp. 1–15, the quote is from p. 13.


12 For our interpretations of Mouffe’s poststructuralist politics, especially as it per-
tains to ‘radical and plural democracy’, see, John Paul Jones III and Pamela Moss,

13 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a
Radical Democratic Politics, translated by W. Moore and P. Cammack (London, Verso,
1985).

14 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
(Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974).

15 Peter Jackson and Jan Penrose, ‘Introduction: placing “Race” and Nation’, in
Constructions of Race, Place and Nation, Peter Jackson and Jan Penrose, (eds).
(Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1993), pp. 1–23.

16 Toni Morrison, Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination (Cam-

17 Walter Benjamin, ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’, Illuminations, Hannah
28 According to the Russian formalist, Mikhail Bakhtin, verbal signs are never fixed but always an arena of struggle. Though dominant groups may attempt to fix the meaning of words in ‘unitary language’, all language operates as ‘heteroglossia’; this multi-accenctuality becomes apparent as various interests clash over the meaning of words. *See* his ‘Discourse in the Novel’, in *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*, Michael Holquist, (ed.), translated by Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin, University of Texas Press, 1981).
30 Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, p. 33.
32 Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, p. 183. The full quote: ‘The mere existence of the other is a provocation. Every “other” person who “doesn’t know his place” must be forced back within his proper confines – those of unrestricted terror’.
33 bell hooks, ‘Choosing the Margin as a Space of Radical Openness’, in *Yearning: Race, Gender, and Cultural Politics* (Boston, South End Press, 1989), pp. 145–53.
37 *See* Gunnar Olsson, ‘Signs of Persuasion’, in *Objectivity and its Other*, Wolfgang

38 For a discussion of the alignments of meanings, practices, and identities in space, see Tim Cresswell, In Place/Out of Place, (Minneapolis. University of Minnesota Press, 1995).


42 Appalshop is loosely linked to a number of organizations throughout Appalachia that have fought against economic and cultural domination. For descriptions of the activities of other groups, see: Stephen L. Fisher, (ed.), Fighting Back in Appalachia: Traditions of Resistance and Change, (Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1993).


44 Recent Appalshop films include: Fast Food Women; Beyond Measure: Appalachian Culture and Economy; Fighting for a Breath; Justice in the Coalfields; and Evelyn Williams (a portrait of the African-American grassroots organizer working in West Virginia, Kentucky, and Brooklyn, New York).